July 21, 2020
It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support for
its adventurism as much as it is the other way around
By Abdus Sattar Ghazali
It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support for its adventurism as much as it is the other way around says Retired Lt. General Syed Ata Hasnain.
In an article published by the Indian Express General Hasnain argued that the mutuality of interests has increased and military coordination between China and Pakistan has become a larger part of the overall strategy.
China may It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support for its adventurism as much as it is the other way around force further escalation this season depending upon how the world responds to its expansionism. Yet it could also adopt a posture which prepares it, along with Pakistan, towards a future “pincer approach” in Ladakh, according to him.
This does not presuppose the limitation of Chinese intent to just Ladakh — Arunachal, Sikkim and the Central Sector very much under the scanner as part of the expanded collusive strategy. However, it is Ladakh where the effect is intended most and it is there that the pincer approach may prove more challenging for India.
Currently, India may not be optimally prepared for such a contingency but the Chinese may not be either. This is because they have tried setting the stage too early in their eagerness to spring a surprise — in turn, the Chinese could be surprised.
That is where Pakistan comes in as a force multiplier to keep the options open as far as timing is concerned — the current campaigning season or a postponed one. In postponing, the Chinese will seek greater Pakistani activity in J&K and Ladakh, including attempts to keep the LoC alive along with terror in the hinterland to dilute Indian optimization in Ladakh. The Line of Control (LoC) is a military control line between the Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir.
Assuming that confrontation with the Sino-Pak combine is inevitable now or later, one of the ways for India to offset this is to project sufficient capability…….. China’s success or failure in such adventurism will set the course of its future strategy against its multiple adversaries. That is the psyche which India must exploit to prevent escalation and win this and impending standoffs without fighting. This needs a rapid and all-out national effort with highest priority accorded to it, including budgeting. China has made the major mistake of creating a face-off that it thought it could win without fighting but it is now mired in a situation that it did not think through.
Extending this face-off will be a logistics nightmare for both countries. On its part, India cannot afford to focus only on the northern borders. A firm and full strategy to deal with Pakistan in all contingencies has now become imperative.
Standoff in Ladakh continues
Meanwhile, the impasse in Eastern Ladakh continues as ‘disengagement on the Line of Control (LOC) is an intricate process’, The Indian Express reported Monday.
Four rounds of marathon meetings between the XIV Corps commander and his Chinese counterpart, the commander of the South Xinjiang Military District have not exactly resulted in a great agreement on both sides withdrawing to and occupying pre-April positions. The talks are a tedious, prolonged process.
One reason for the long duration of the meetings is the need to translate everything. It seems the Chinese are playing for time. These are their typical tactics.
In the meanwhile, the issue of border tension in a strategically vital region and more importantly Chinese intrusions into Indian territory have been relegated to the inside pages of newspapers. The media seems to have lost interest in the matter. The matter is now on the backburner. The ground position is that Chinese troops are yet to return to positions occupied by them before April.
As information comes in and previously collated data is confirmed or denied identification of PLA (Chinese Army) formations can be done now. With the passage of time and increasing visibility formations and their locations can be recognized with greater fluency. 4th Highland Motorised Infantry Division is now confirmed to be deployed in the eastern part of the Depsang Plains held by the Chinese.
This is a launching pad against Daulet Beg Oldie and the western part of the Plains held by Indian troops. The formation has been mobilised from Aksu lying at the northern edge of the Tarim Basin. The Kashgar-based 6th Highland Mechanised Infantry Division, now present in full strength threatens the Galwan River Valley, Hot Springs/Gogra and the Fingers Area. Not so much the occupation of territory, it is the presence of these offensive formations opposite our border that pose the real and imminent threat. In the next article the exact order of battle of these formations is discussed to give the reader an idea of their capabilities.
Elements of the 362nd and 363rd Border Defence Regiments are located in penny-packets here and there bolstering up defences and manning observation posts. I had earlier mentioned the airborne mechanised brigade moved into the theatre from Hubei province in Central China with great publicity as a psyops tactic. This is part of the PLAAF (Chinese Air Force) strategic force the Airborne Corps. This is held in reserve for vertical envelopment operations using the abundant heli-lift available. The intention is to get in the rear of Indian forces and seize key communication nodes and high-value targets. However, the well-known vulnerability of helicopters in the face of modern air defence weapons including Akash missiles might bring these plans to naught.
Surface to surface missiles held in impregnable underground shelters at two locations, one each in Aksai Chin and Xinjiang along with their transporters, erectors and launchers (TELs) pose a real danger. These can be used to hit high-value targets like the IAF’s airbases and advanced landing grounds (ALGs). A long-term threat are the two mountain mechanised divisions located in bases on the eastern periphery of Pakistani-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan. The danger that these forces pose to Siachen, Kargil and the Kashmir Valley in conjunction with Pakistani troops cannot be discounted.
The one division plus and an armored brigade with which India normally garrisons Eastern Ladakh has been reinforced many times over with backup formations both from Northern Command and Army HQ reserves. Opposed to them are two full-strength Chinese mobile divisions earmarked for high-altitude warfare, an airborne brigade and some odds and ends amounting to two more brigades.
Abdus Sattar Ghazali is the Chief Editor of the Journal of America (www.journalofamerica.net) Email asghazali2011 (@) gmail.com
The Journal of America Team:
Editor in chief:
Abdus Sattar Ghazali
Senior Editor:
Prof. Arthur Scott
Special Correspondent
Maryam Turab
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