July 23, 2020

Saudi Arabia’s relations with China are functional but not strategic

By Abdus Sattar Ghazali

Saudi Arabia’s relations with China are functional, but not strategic, says Bruce Riedel, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst.

In an article published by Brookings Institution, where he is now a senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Riedel argues: Saudi Arabia values its relations with China, but it is well aware of their limits. Beijing will not replace Washington in Riyadh’s worldview, even if U.S.-Saudi relations falter in the next administration.

As with most issues concerning the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh’s relations with China are all about oil. China is Saudi Arabia’s top economic trading partner because China is the biggest importer of Saudi oil. There is little strategic cooperation between the two, however, and China does not share the Saudis’ hostility to Iran, Riedel said adding: Saudi Arabia’s strategic partner remains the United States, and almost all of its arms supply comes from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western states.

Retracing the China-Saudi relations, Riedel said during 1980s, the Saudis were eager to acquire medium-range ballistic missiles to deter both Iran and Israel, but their traditional arms suppliers in the West would not sell them.

Fahd and his defense minister, Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, decided to reach out to China. Sultan turned to two of his sons — Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan Al Saud, and his brother who commanded Saudi Arabia’s air defense, Prince Khalid bin Sultan Al Saud — to open a dialogue with Beijing and then bring and install missiles to the kingdom covertly, according to the former CIA analyst.

Bandar privately approached his Chinese counterpart in Washington, Han Xu, and asked if Beijing would provide missiles. The answer back was positive, so borrowing from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s playbook, Bandar traveled to Pakistan where he met secretly with Chinese officials. In July 1985, Bandar made the first of three secret visits to Beijing to work out the details.

The Chinese then sent a secret team to Riyadh to meet with Prince Khalid to engage military-to-military. The deal was finalized in December 1986: Approximately 50 Chinese CSS-2 missiles, code-named East Wind; they would be shipped to Saudi Arabia and installed in hidden in ground installations; and the Chinese would train Saudi crews to operate them. Khalid made four trips to China to finalize all the details and oversee the transfer. Khalid later wrote that the missiles gave “us the capability to counterattack in event of an attack on us by either Israel or Iran.”

The Central Intelligence Agency detected the missile base in Saudi Arabia in early 1988, prompting an immediate crisis between Washington and Riyadh. President Ronald Reagan wanted the missiles removed immediately, but Fahd refused. The story leaked into the Washington Post on March 18, 1988.

According to the Washington Post, the missiles are Chinese CSS2-class surface-to-surface missiles that in their most advanced form have a range of about 2,200 miles. Weapons of such range could permit Saudi Arabia to exert a significantly greater impact on regional disputes ranging from the Persian Gulf War between Iran and Iraq to Arab-Israeli conflicts.

The CSS2 is believed to be an offshoot of the rocket used by China to launch its first satellite in 1970. The Chinese have been developing various military versions, including one adapted for naval warfare, since the 1970s. Its different models have ranges running from about 1,000 miles to 2,200 miles, and the sources said the Saudis are believed to have acquired the most advanced type.

The deal was also puzzling in that China equips the CSS-2 with nuclear warheads. Why do the Saudis only have conventional warheads? Rumors of a secret Pakistani commitment to provide nuclear warheads have swirled for years, also without confirmation, Riedel said.

To underscore their anger with Washington’s criticism of the missile purchase, Fahd had U.S. Ambassador Hume Horan expelled from the kingdom, Riedel said.

The missiles remain operational in Saudi Arabia to this day. The Saudis only displayed them once to the public: in 2014, during a parade to honor the visiting Pakistani army chief of staff, General Raheel Sharif. They have never been used in combat, either with Iraq in 1991 or today in the war in Yemen.

The missile deal led to the opening of Saudi diplomatic relations with China after another Bandar trip to Beijing in July 1990. But it did not lead to additional large sales of military equipment.  The Saudis have purchased drones from China, which they use in Yemen, Riedel said adding: 

“Saudi Arabia continues to rely on American and British aircraft for its air force, American tanks for its army, and Canadian infantry fighting vehicles for its National Guard”. 

CIA helped Saudis in secret Chinese missile deal in 2007

Tellingly, the Newsweek reported in January 2014 that Saudi Arabia bought ballistic missiles from China in 2007 in a hitherto unreported deal that won Washington's quiet approval on the condition that CIA technical experts could verify they were not designed to carry nuclear warheads.

The solid-fueled, medium-range DF-21 East Wind missiles are an improvement over the DF-3s the Saudis clandestinely acquired from China in 1988, experts say, although they differ on how much of an upgrade they were.

The newer missiles, known as CSS-5s in NATO parlance, have a shorter range but greater accuracy, making them more useful against "high-value targets in Tehran, like presidential palaces or supreme-leader palaces," Jeffrey Lewis, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, tells Newsweek.

Bruce Riedel says “If former Vice President Joe Biden wins the November election, a Democrat-run foreign policy is likely to bring some profound changes in U.S. policy with the kingdom. Biden has called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” that should be “punished” for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. He has joined with other key Democrats in calling for a halt to arms sales as long as the Yemen war continues (despite the fact that the war began on his watch, under President Barack Obama). A downgraded relationship, especially with the crown prince, is all but certain.”

The Chinese may try to take advantage of the downturn, but given the significant limits discussed above on their influence, any improvement in Saudi-China relations is likely to be more symbolic than substantial, Riedel concluded.

Abdus Sattar Ghazali is the Chief Editor of the Journal of America (www.journalofamerica.net) Email asghazali2011 (@) gmail.com
 

 The Journal of America Team:

 Editor in chief:
Abdus Sattar Ghazali

Senior Editor:
Prof. Arthur Scott

Special Correspondent
Maryam Turab
 

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