July 4, 2020
China intruded in Ladakh and Arunachal
but Modi’s govt is in Denial says The Quint
By Abdus Sattar Ghazali
India has become a little smaller and China just got a bit bigger, Rohit Khanna of the Quint says adding: “It is now clear we have lost control of the land on our side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Depsang, at the Galwan Valley, at Pangong Lake in Eastern Ladakh and at least 3 areas along our border with China in Arunachal Pradesh as well.”
The first step to getting any of this land back, Khanna argues, it would be for the Indian government to categorically accept that contrary to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘no intrusion’ remarks, substantial incursions have taken place while this government looked away.
While Indian Army sources claim to have “matched” the PLA’s additional deployments of troops, artillery guns and armoured vehicles at every sector along the LAC in Ladakh, the fact is that China has occupied strategically critical chunks of Indian territory and wants us to accept it all as the new status quo, Khanna added.
According to Khanna in East Ladakh, the Chinese army now controls a crucial Y-junction near the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP’s) Burtse camp, about 15 kilometres within India’s side of the Line of Actual Control. It’s also known as ‘Bottleneck’ because ITBP soldiers headed for Patrol Points 10, 11, 12 or 13 must cross this junction. Earlier, both armies patrolled the area, but the Chinese have stopped the ITBP from going past this point since April.
The ITBP has been told to avoid clashes and simply not patrol points 10,11,12 and 13. Also, the Chinese have done this before – they occupied this same Y-Junction-Raki Nallah area in 2013 as well but were pushed back in 21 days. But this time, even after 90 days, they are still there. Also, note that control over Depsang allows China to threaten India’s crucial Daulat Beg Oldi airbase, 30 kilometres to the north and a lifeline for our troops at the Siachen Glacier.
India’s presence at Depsang keeps it forces within striking distance of the Karakoram Pass that China controls.
China’s second intrusion is at the Galwan Valley – exactly at Patrol Point 14 where India lost 20 of its soldiers within days of the clash. Even as generals and diplomats were in talks, the Chinese set up a larger camp with gun positions in place of the observation post that Indian troops destroyed on 15 June. \
China’s third intrusion is on the north shore of Pangong Tso, that’s been talked about a fair bit, and is well-documented too. The Chinese army now controls the area between Finger 4 and Finger 8, eight kilometres to the west of the LAC that passes through Finger 8. The Indian Army’s patrols are now stopped at Finger 4 and it is no longer allowed to patrol till Finger 8. Forty square kilometres of Indian territory is no longer in our control. China has built army posts all over the former no-man’s land, on the ridges, and along the lake. Latest reports in The Indian Express say China has now also built a Helipad at Finger 4.
Arunachal Pradesh
With Chinese and Indian troops eyeball-to-eyeball at seven places inside India’s claimed territory in Ladakh and Sikkim, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has begun stepping up activity opposite Arunachal Pradesh as well, the Business Standard reported.
The newspaper quoted Indian sources as saying that PLA troops here are reinforcing their posts in large numbers, increasing their patrolling and stepping up violations of the Indian border – which in Arunachal Pradesh runs along the McMahon Line.
The two sectors that are seeing the most PLA activity are Tawang and Walong – which both bore the brunt of the Chinese offensive in 1962.
There is also aggressive Chinese activity in the Asaphila sector, which the Chinese attacked and captured in the 1962 war. Over preceding days, there have been multiple PLA incursions across the McMahon Line here, say sources. The Chinese have also established temporary camps, just across the border from the Kepang La and Sying La passes.
While there has been no occupation of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh yet, as there has in Ladakh, the army taking the Chinese activity seriously, the Quint said.
China claims all of Arunachal as Chinese territory, a claim India rejects. Arunachal’s northern borders, also known as the McMahon line, are India’s borders with China, which it expects China to respect.
India’s options to end border standoff with China
Sushant Singh of the Indian Express discusses four options for India to restore status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The first option may be to evict the Chinese by force, destroy what they built. But Singh rules out this option arguing:
The most straightforward course of action would be for Indian soldiers to push out the Chinese from the new areas that they have occupied in the last eight weeks, and destroy all the infrastructure China has built on the Indian side of the LAC.
This, however, will almost certainly lead to military escalation and in a full-blown war. Even the limited attempt to evict the Chinese from the observation post near PP14 on June 15 led to the clash in which 20 Indian soldiers and an unspecified number of Chinese lost their lives.
The second option could be what Singh calls a ‘Quid pro quo’ tactic which he says possible but unlikely on the following ground:
There are areas on the LAC that are not strongly defended by the Chinese, where Indian soldiers can move in and occupy a swathe of Chinese territory. At the negotiating table, the two sides can then exchange the occupied territories, and restore status quo ante.
The ‘QPQ’ option exists even now, as the entire LAC from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh cannot be physically defended by the Chinese army. But such proactive options have a certain window of opportunity, which may have been lost after eight weeks of tensions. Also, it carries the risk of military escalation, as the Chinese may misread it as a larger military attack, or see it as a provocation.
The third option, which is more likely, is hold the line and negotiate. According to Singh:
In this scenario, the Indian Army “holds the line” by deploying in strength along the LAC to ensure that the Chinese do not ingress deeper. This stops the Chinese at their current positions, while preparing Indian defences and allowing for a buildup of troops for any eventuality that may arise. The forces also get time to build up arsenal and stocks through import of critical material.
Advantage can be taken of the prevailing global mood against the aggressive Chinese behaviour against numerous countries on various issues. It could allow for the formation of newer diplomatic, security, and trade partnerships to put China under pressure.
And the biggest risk is that the Chinese may not actually concede anything on the ground even as Indians continue to hold the line — the continued Chinese deployment and new constructions could alter the status quo permanently.
The fourth option, according to Singh is a limited war with China. However he finds this highly unlikely because:
It can be limited in terms of geography — say, only in Ladakh, or in time — for a few days before India unilaterally declares a cessation of hostilities. This would be a very bold move; it carries the greatest risk of a full-blown war against a well-prepared adversary. Also, China has integrated theatre commands, where the full Sino-Indian border is seen as a single front under their western theatre command. It may not keep the war limited to the areas India would want it to, and stretch the Indian military fully.
This option also needs a heavy commitment of military resources, which will impact India’s post-Covid economic revival. There will be no global appetite to take sides, and Pakistan could simultaneously open another front. The only advantage is of sending China a strong message — because a bigger power, in this case China, has to win unequivocally, whereas not getting defeated can in itself be seen as a win for India.
According to the Economist of UK, “militarily, India faces a fait accompli. China’s new positions give its forces a strategic advantage, making it difficult for Indian troops to hit back. Taunting Chinese soldiers have even inscribed a giant map of China on one patch of newly grabbed terrain. India could imitate China’s tactics and create its own new forward positions, but such tit-for-tat moves could simply go on at mounting cost over many years, with China’s bigger budgets and superior infrastructure putting it in a better position to dig in.”
Abdus Sattar Ghazali is the Chief Editor of the Journal of America (www.journalofamerica.net) email: asghazali2011 (@) gmail.com
The Journal of America Team:
Editor in chief:
Abdus Sattar Ghazali
Senior Editor:
Prof. Arthur Scott
Special Correspondent
Maryam Turab
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