September 1, 2020
Pravin Swhney:
Unless backed by military power, warnings mean little
By Pravin Swhney, Editor of Force Magazine
Editor’s Note: This is a transcript of Mr. Pravin Swhney’s You Tube talk on August 26. Only minor adjustments are made for clarity.
Indian Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat has said the military option is on the table, if talks fails between India and China over Ladakh. The talks are going-on on two levels, on the military level and the diplomatic level.
Certainly China and the PLA would have taken note of the statement issued by India’s top most military commander which basically is suggesting that India will wait to see the outcome of the talks.
If it is not successful it will exercise the military option to evict the PLA from the territories that India considers belongs to India.
So everything now hinges on the outcome of the talks. Let me say the talks will not succeed. They will not succeed because they have become over a period of time very complex and complicated.
To explain that I will talk of certain things which still have not come in the media.
But my stand point will be the 5th of August 2019 when India revoked its constitution Article 370 and declared Ladakh as union territory. The Chinese said that you changed the status quo but the Indian side didn’t relent.
So on May 5th 2020, the PLA changed the status quo on the ground. In a very wide sweep of area from North Sikkim to entire Eastern Ladakh in multiple intrusions, some of them deep intrusions 8 km, 18 km, they have come inside India’s territory and they are sitting there now.
Now what they are saying is that the 1993 peace treaty which created the Line of Control (LAC), the treaty is fine, the LAC we do not accept, because the LAC then was neither accepted (marked) on map nor on the ground.
So what they are saying is that the 1993 peace treaty and all the subsequent treaties will be applicable only on the other LAC which exists and which is in the letter of Chinese Prime Minister Chou En Lai in September 1959 wrote to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
In other words, they are explaining further that in 1962 war the PLA withdrew from Ladakh 20 km because they wanted to create a demilitarized zone from their LAC and their Claim Line which are same of 1959.
What they are accusing the Indian army is that over a period of time (India) has done a creeping movement and occupied the PLA territory and India needs to vacate that.
They are saying that the LAC is very close to our claim line but still not there and certainly from more area Indian army has to go back.
This is what they are saying at the military level talks. So at the diplomatic level talks they are talking about their claim line. Our diplomats have come up with India’s claim line and that is the Johnson Line.
Johnson Line
This needs a little explanation. This Johnson line, India is claiming was created in 1865 when British India nominated of their surveyors called W. N. Johnson with the task of creating a line on the map, demarcating the border of British India and Tibet. He put this line at Kun Lun mountain range. So if Kun Lun range was inside British India that meant that entire Aksai Chin which fell between these two ranges – the Kun Lun and the Karakoram mountain range - belonged to British India, now to India.
Johnson’s masters were not happy with him so he resigned. But Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir was very pleased with him because he showed Aksai Chin in Kashmir, so he made him governor of Ladakh. As governor of Ladakh Mr. Johnson came up with Kashmir survey atlas in 1868 which shows the Johnson Line and Kun Lun Range.
Now a century later, when Mr. Chou En Lai came in April 1960 for border resolution with Prime Minister Nehru and he gave a package deal that we are happy with the de-facto acceptance of the McMahon Line in the Eastern Sector provided you accept Karakoram Range as the border between India and China.
Mr. T. N. Kole who is a former foreign secretary, in Diplomats Diary, says when Nehru was in dialogue with Chou En Lai team and this proposal was made by Mr. Chou En Lai, he went out to talk to his advisors. Nehru told his advisors that look the Chinese Premier is saying why we not accept the Karakoram range.
His advisors gave two reasons to reject this proposal. (1) That we have a very hard cast iron case. What was that good case that India had? It was the Kashmir Survey Atlas of 1868. Now how can a unilaterally drawn Atlas which has not been accepted by China be a cast iron case? (2) And the second reason was that Kun Lun range is better from the defense angle.
Now we are talking in 1960. In 1957 India had been surprised when it was told about the highway which Chinese had created which is known as G219 Highway which cuts across Aksai Chin. (With an area of 38,000 sq kms, Aksai Chin is currently administered by China, but claimed by India.)
Today what Chinese are saying at the talks is that look the two claim lines, the claim line of the Jonson Line and the 1959 claim line, are very difficult to reconcile. This will take a long time and this needs political intervention.
So for the time being focus on the LAC and their proposal is that both sides withdraw because the big requirement right now is that at least at three places there should be disengagement not the de-escalation because troops on both sides are close to less than mandatory 100 yards where the banner drill is done.
India is insisting that how we can withdraw farther from our own territory. So that is where the thing is stuck at the moment and it is not possible to move further. Now despite all this the warning has been issued by General Rawat.
So first thing is the timing of the threat that he has given because the timing of the threat does not give credibility to the threat. The reason is that there is that there is a lot that the Indian army needs to do. It needs to create a habitat.
First of all the Indian army was surprised by the intrusion of the PLA. So much so that the normal practice in the Eastern Theater, there are lots of formations which are not in full strength. The troops are elsewhere. Now they have to be brought in. There are reports that 40,000 additional troops have been added to the theater.
In Ladakh alone, reports say, that there are two divisions and there are two armored brigades, besides support elements. So we are talking of a habitat. The winter is approaching. The military echo system needs to be created, which basically means that there are already reports, ammunition is coming from outside, so many platforms are coming from outside.
Then the calibration of the weapon needs to be done. The troops have to be familiarized themselves with the theater.
Most of all, a certain amount of training is needed at high altitude. We are talking of heights of 15,000 feet plus. All this will take a minimum of six months to be ready.
General Rawat’s threat
So, General Rawat’s threat been given today does not sound credible at all.
Let us say he has a plan but after six month when he feels that the talks did not make any headway.
Basically, what are these talks? Now as far as PLA is concerned, they are firm on their position. They are not budging but they are not saying no to talks when Indian side asks for talks, because they feel that there is a possibility of Indian side change their position.
Let us say there is a military plan and according to the plan you fire.
As far as PLA is concerned they are very clear, we will not fire first. But if we are attacked we will counter attack which means war.
Now if India starts fire first, we are looking at three wars:
(1) First of all given the political synchronization and military intra operability that we have seen between China and Pakistan is quite in the open. It is almost certainty that the LAC will be very live. So much so, that there is no possibility of any Indian army duel use formations being shifted from Line of Control (in Kashmir) to the Line of Actual Control against China.
(2) There is something like 80,000 Rashtra troops of the Indian army which are in the Kashmir Valley and doing counter-terrorism operation. In case of a crisis and war they are supposed to go back to their primary task on the Line of Control. This will not be possible because in the Valley people are sitting with rage. There is a problem there. Indian army’s internal line of communication will be extremely vulnerable.
Once the PLA has upper hand then we should be prepared for a double pincer attack on Siachin and Sub-sector North by the Pakistan Army and the PLA. They have been doing intra-operability in northern Ladakh since 2011.
Now come to PLA. You see the PLA, as I keep saying in my Videos, they will fight to their strength. They will not fight to the strength of Indian Army which is man-power. Their strength is technology.
The Journal of America Team:
Editor in chief:
Abdus Sattar Ghazali
Senior Editor:
Prof. Arthur Scott
Special Correspondent
Maryam Turab
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